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Abstract 
Whether social transfers should be targeted or universal is an unsolved debate influencing the 
implementation of social protection schemes in developing countries. While the limited 
availability of public resources encourages targeting, the difficulty to identify the poor promotes 
a universal allocation. To address this question, this study examines the targeting performance of 
India’s social pension scheme and the factors associated with access in 2004-05 and 2011-12, a 
time period of important reforms addressing social pension coverage and amount. The analysis 
shows that the reforms had limited success: The share of elderly poor not receiving social 
pensions decreased, but at the same time the share of elderly non-poor receiving social pensions 
slightly increased. Compared to a random allocation of social pensions, the benefits from 
targeting are very low despite of the implemented eligibility reforms. As intended by the reforms, 
holding a Below Poverty Line ration card has become the primary determinant of access to social 
pensions. However, this result holds also for non-poor individuals who exploit the unwarranted 
possession of a Below Poverty Line ration card to obtain social pension benefits. Even though the 
reforms were intended to make the beneficiary selection more transparent, the empirical results 
indicate that after the reforms individuals who have direct connections to local government 
officials are more likely to access social pension benefits. 
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1. Introduction 
Accelerating demographic change, a persistently large informal sector and weakening family 
support for the elderly have important implications for old-age poverty in developing countries. 
Multi-generational household models that traditionally provided support to the elderly are 
diminishing due to declining fertility and migration (James, 2011). In contrast to the minority of 
formal sector workers that benefit from comprehensive social protection and old-age income 
security, the vast majority of informal sector workers is expected to face increased risks of old-
age poverty in the near future given their lack of social protection coverage (e.g. Lloyd-Sherlock, 
2000). Implemented as cash transfers, social pensions aim to mitigate old-age poverty faced by 
elderly individuals who lack social protection coverage (Holzmann & Hinz, 2005). To improve 
the old-age income security of the elderly poor, in 1995, the Indian government introduced the 
National Old Age Pension Scheme (Government of India, 1995).1  
The effectiveness of social pensions in terms of old-age poverty reduction depends crucially on 
whether social pensions reach the elderly poor or not. However, the targeting performance 
remains an under-researched topic in India and existing studies suffer from different limitations. 
Dutta et al. (2010) and Gupta (2013) analyzed the implementation of social pensions in a 
descriptive manner for only a few selected states. Chopra and Puddussery (2014) and Garroway 
(2013) based their analysis on cross-sectional data sources and therefore could not rule out 
omitted variable bias. The latest study by Kaushal (2014) used repeated cross-sectional data for 
all of India but lacked data on social pension receipt and needed to approximate beneficiary 
status. Research on social pensions in other countries (e.g. Brazil and South Africa) has made the 
importance of social pensions for poverty reduction evident. The impact of social pensions is not 
restricted to the well-being of direct beneficiaries; other household members and especially 
grandchildren seem to benefit as well from the transfer (e.g. Duflo, 2000; Edmonds, Mammen, & 
Miller, 2005; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2006). 
Unlike the existing literature, I focus in this paper on the targeting performance of social pensions 
to answer the question whether social pensions reach the elderly poor. A better understanding of 
this question is a substantial prerequisite for analyzing the effectiveness of social pensions in 
India and other developing countries with similar institutions that might face similar targeting 
                                                          
1 While this national social pension scheme was introduced in the mid-nineties, several Indian states had previously 
implemented social pensions on the state level. 
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challenges. I first assess the targeting performance by quantifying the share of elderly poor 
receiving social pensions (coverage), the share of elderly poor not receiving social pensions 
(exclusion error) and the share of elderly non-poor receiving social pensions (inclusion error). 
Second, I analyze who receives social pensions and examine which factors affect access to social 
pensions and how these factors changed over time. Finally, I compare the relevant factors for 
poor and non-poor individuals. 
To address the targeting challenge, the Government of India introduced social pension reforms in 
2007. The results suggest that from 2004-05 to 2011-12, these reforms contributed to a reduction 
of the exclusion error but at the same time the inclusion error increased. Despite reform efforts, 
both targeting errors continue to be very high and the benefits from targeting compared to a 
hypothetical random allocation of social pensions appear to be negligible. Even though the 
allocation of social pensions has shifted towards the Below Poverty Line (BPL) card as a more 
observable criterion, this criterion itself is too weakly implemented to achieve effective targeting 
of the poor. BPL card holding is used by both poor and non-poor individuals to access social 
pensions and individuals who have direct connections with the local government have higher 
chances to receive the benefits. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the background 
information on the implementation of social pensions in India and summarizes existing literature 
in this field. Section 3 provides the theoretical framework by describing the targeting challenges 
and how social pension reforms in the Indian context are related to it. Section 4 describes the data 
and explains the methodology. In section 5, I present the results from descriptive statistics and 
regression analysis before concluding in section 6. 
2. Background: Social pensions in India 
The need for an effective social pension scheme in India has been reinforced by progressing 
demographic change interlinked with weakening family support. Throughout the last decades, life 
expectancy has been increasing and fertility rates have been falling. Both developments together 
cause a continuously increasing old-age dependency ratio. As illustrated in Figure 1, while the 
current old-age dependency ratio is 8.6%, it is expected to rise to 20.5% in 2050 (United Nations, 
2015). The fact that more than 90 percent of the labor force is working in the informal sector 
implies that the vast majority of elderly lacks all safety nets from which formal sector workers 
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benefit (Sastry, 2004). Many of them also lack adequate savings and their well-being in old-age 
depends essentially on governmental support beyond the support that their families can provide. 
Figure 1: India’s old-age dependency ratio from 1970 to 2050 
 
The old-age dependency ratio is defined as the number of elderly individuals (65 years 
and older) divided by the number of working age individuals (15-64 years). 
Source: Author’s illustration, data from United Nations, 2015. 
The Indian government recognized the need for social pensions and introduced the National Old 
Age Pension Scheme in 1995 (Government of India, 1995). The Ministry of Rural Development 
is in charge of the social pension scheme but the state governments are responsible for the 
implementation through panchayats2 and municipalities, as stated in the guidelines from 1995: 
“The Panchayats/Municipalities will be responsible for implementing the schemes [and] are 
expected to play an active role in the identification of beneficiaries” (Government of India, 1995, 
p. 4). In addition to the eligibility age, the original guidelines by the Government of India stated 
that “the applicant must be a destitute in the sense of having little or no regular means of 
subsistence from his/her own sources of income or through financial support from family 
members or other sources” (Government of India, 1995, p. 5). 
At the national level, the social pension reforms in India aimed at increasing the social pension 
amount as well as the coverage. In 2006, the central government contribution to the social 
pension amount was increased from 75 INR to 200 INR and the central government requested all 
                                                          
2 Panchayats (i.e. village council) and municipalities represent the smallest local governance unit in rural and urban 
India respectively. 
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state governments to match the central government contribution (Government of India, 2006).3 In 
2007, the central government removed the cap on the number of beneficiaries and recommended 
to use the BPL card as eligibility criterion in addition to age (Government of India, 2007). Hence, 
from 2004-05 to 2011-12 the targeting mechanism of the national social pension scheme changed 
substantially. Instead of instructing local government officials to select the destitute elderly as 
beneficiaries, since 2007, they are supposed to use a more concrete criterion, the BPL card, for 
targeting. The timeline in Figure 2 gives an overview of the reforms and the IHDS data collection 
periods. 
Figure 2: Timeline of national social pension reforms and IHDS data collection 
 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
Similar to the national level social pension reforms, state governments also increasingly 
introduced BPL card holding as eligibility criterion for state level social pension schemes existing 
in many states in parallel to the national level social pension scheme. Guidelines and official 
documents published by state governments show that in many cases the unclear destitution 
criterion was replaced by the BPL card holding criterion (see Asri, Michaelowa, Panda, & Paul, 
2016).4 Hence, by law the relevance of holding a BPL card to access social pensions has 
increased. In India, BPL cards are also commonly used for access to other social protection 
schemes such as heavily subsidized health insurance, housing or food, despite strong criticism of 
its allocation which often neglects poorer households and allows non poor households to access 
benefits (Alkire & Seth, 2013; Ram, Mohanty, & Ram, 2009). 
                                                          
3 In terms of purchasing power parity, 75 INR corresponded to 6.65 international USD in 2005 and 200 INR 
corresponded to 12.5 international USD in 2012 (World Bank, 2016). 
4 This is based on state level eligibility criteria for state level social pension schemes retrieved from different state 
government documents and websites. Taking into account this background information is important as IHDS data 
only includes information on whether an individual receives a social pension and it is not possible to differentiate 
between the national and the state social pension scheme. 
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Previous literature on the targeting performance of social pensions in India is limited. In the case 
of Rajasthan, Dutta (2008) reports evidence of under-coverage, high transaction costs of the 
application process, and not strictly enforced eligibility criteria. She further emphasizes that using 
BPL cards as eligibility criterion would worsen rather than strengthen the targeting of social 
pensions in the case of Rajasthan. This is in line with Ajwad (2007) who found for Uttar Pradesh 
that in 2004-05 70 percent of individuals from the poorest quintile did not possess any BPL or 
Antyodaya card (for the poorest families in the country), while 13 percent of the richest quintile 
possessed one of the two ration cards. Similarly, Ram et al. (2009) show that 40 percent of the 
BPL cards are possessed by non-poor households in India, and many deprived households do not 
hold a BPL card. Given the switch from the destitution criterion to the BPL card criterion, the 
targeting performance of social pensions in India is directly interlinked with the targeting 
performance of BPL cards. To date, there has been no comprehensive assessment of the targeting 
performance of social pensions in India and the existing knowledge relies on few studies which 
assessed the targeting performance of BPL cards, or focused on specific states to examine the 
implementation of social pensions. 
3. Theoretical framework 
After briefly summarizing the theoretical literature on targeting challenges, I describe the 
theoretical expectations on how the social pension reforms in the Indian context might have 
affected the targeting performance of social pension benefits. 
3.1 The targeting challenge 
The theoretical motivation behind targeting is clear: Allocating public resources only to those in 
need improves the effectiveness of poverty alleviation measures and keeps public spending low 
(Coady, Grosh, & Hoddinott, 2004). Targeting of social protection schemes gained particular 
importance in the phase of macroeconomic and structural adjustments when governments had to 
reduce public expenditures. However, targeting itself can be very costly especially in developing 
countries where data availability is limited and administration weak (Besley & Kanbur, 1990). 
Based on the various challenges that targeting is exposed to; even the strongest supporters agree 
that it is impossible to achieve precise targeting. Information gaps, missing data, misreporting 
and corruption lead to exclusion and inclusion errors in practice. These problems tend to be even 
more severe in developing countries that need effective poverty alleviation most (Dutrey, 2007).  
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In general, high exclusion errors and/or inclusion errors reduce the impact of an anti-poverty 
scheme (Slater, Farrington, Samson, & Akter, 2009). Exclusion error corresponds to the share of 
individuals in the target population not being covered by the social protection scheme and 
inclusion error is defined as the share of beneficiaries not belonging to the target population. In 
other words, the exclusion error stands for targeted individuals not receiving the benefits they are 
entitled to and the inclusion error implies that resources are absorbed by non-targeted individuals 
(Coady et al., 2004). As shown in the table below, an individual is wrongly excluded from an 
anti-poverty program if she is poor and does not receive the benefits and wrongly included if she 
is non-poor and receives the benefits that are targeted towards the poor.5 
Table 1: Exclusion and inclusion error 
 Welfare status of individual Poor Non-Poor 
Individual does not receive benefits 
from anti-poverty program Exclusion error  Successful targeting 
Individual receives benefits from 
anti-poverty program Successful targeting Inclusion error 
Source: Author’s illustration based on Coady et al., 2004, p. 10. 
Following Coady et al. (2004, p. 10), these two commonly used measures of mistargeting are 
quantified as follows. The indicator for the exclusion error is the number of poor individuals who 
are excluded from the program (𝑁𝑝.𝑜) divided by the number of poor individuals (𝑁𝑝): 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐸𝑒 = 𝑁𝑝.𝑜
𝑁𝑝
  (1) 
The indicator for the inclusion error is the number of beneficiaries of the anti-poverty program 
who are classified as non-poor divided (𝑁𝑛𝑝,𝑖) by the number of beneficiaries (𝑁𝑖): 
𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐸𝑒 =  𝑁𝑛𝑝,𝑖
𝑁𝑖
 (2) 
 
Approaches aimed at reducing the exclusion error of a social protection scheme typically face the 
risk of simultaneously increasing the inclusion error and vice versa. For instance, relaxing 
documentation requirements to reduce the exclusion error will also make non-targeted 
individuals’ access easier (Coady et al., 2004). Considering the existing knowledge on the 
                                                          
5 Since this section is about exclusion and inclusion errors for the general case of anti-poverty scheme, I do not take 
into account the age criterion here which is relevant for social pensions. The methodology section below explains 
specifically for social pensions how I consider age and poverty status of the individuals to measure exclusion and 
inclusion error. 
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targeting challenge, this study will shed light on how the described social pension reforms 
affected the targeting performance of India’s social pension scheme. 
3.2 Theoretical expectations 
The welfare effects of social pensions are at the maximum when elderly individuals with 
consumption expenditures below the poverty line (targeted individuals) receive social pensions 
and individuals with consumption expenditures above the poverty line (non-targeted individuals) 
do not. In practice, however, not only poor and old individuals but also non-poor and/or not old 
individuals receive social pensions. Exclusion error and inclusion error exist for multiple reasons. 
Based on the existing literature, it is plausible to assume that the poorest elderly face the biggest 
difficulties in accessing social pensions. They are more likely to lack awareness on social pension 
schemes as well as capabilities and documents required during the application process. Their 
transaction costs for application might also be substantially higher if they lack experience of 
dealing with local governments and/or if they live in remote areas. 
To tackle the targeting issues, the first reform removed the cap on the number of beneficiaries in 
2007. I expect this reform to increase the coverage of the elderly poor and to reduce the exclusion 
error simply due to the increased availability of social pension benefits. At least in principle, 
there are no more reasons to reject anyone who can show that he or she is old and poor. 
Moreover, I would expect that with a cap on the number of beneficiaries in place, better informed 
elderly apply for social pension benefits before other elderly and before the cap on the number of 
beneficiaries is reached. However, the reform may also increase the inclusion error, as the 
inclination to access social pension benefits might increase also among the non-poor who 
perceive higher chances to get the social pension when they become aware of the removed cap. 
The second reform in 2007 focused on the eligibility criteria. The targeting approach for the 
social pension scheme shifted from a vague and non-transparent approach to a better observable 
approach. Theoretically, BPL cards facilitate the identification of beneficiaries. They can make it 
easier for government officials to select beneficiaries and for elderly poor to identify themselves 
as they would be able to show their BPL card more easily than e.g. their low income certificate. 
However, in practice the allocation of BPL cards itself is criticized for being weakly targeted 
towards the poor (see for example Alkire and Seth, 2013). Introducing BPL ration cards as 
eligibility criterion would only lead to an improvement of targeting of social pensions if these 
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cards were better targeted towards the poor than the local governments’ selection based on the 
‘old’ destitution criterion. Given these opposing theoretical expectations, the question whether 
the introduction of this reform improved the targeting performance can only be answered 
empirically. These expectations relate to the aggregate level and are examined in the descriptive 
part of the empirical analysis. 
At the individual level, examined in the regression analysis, targeting problems directly influence 
who obtains access to social pensions and who does not. The theoretical expectations on the 
factors determining individual level access to social pensions are therefore based on the scarcely 
existing literature on the targeting weaknesses of social pensions in India and also influenced by 
research on the relevance of social capital for access to public benefits in developing countries. 
Given the described difficulties in targeting particularly prevalent in a developing country 
context, I expect that access to social pensions does not only depend on an individual’s eligibility. 
For obtaining relevant information and receiving social pensions, contacts and embeddedness in a 
local network also matter. 
First, I expect that individual’s eligibility determined by age and poverty status – destitution 
before 2007 and BPL card holding after – is positively associated with the likelihood to access 
social pensions. Before the reform, proxies for destitution such as the ownership of household 
assets or land holding might have been used to determine the destitution of the elderly person. 
After the reform, I expect to observe an increased importance of BPL card holding. This 
expectation is entirely based on official documents (Government of India, 2007) and should be 
evident in the regression results if state and local governments followed the modified eligibility 
criteria. 
Second, I anticipate that direct connections to local government officials can influence the 
selection of beneficiaries and speed up the granting of social pensions. This concern of 
preferential treatment depending on political connections has been raised already for the last 
decades. Drèze and Sen (1989, p. 107) emphasized that political influence is likely to determine 
the allocation of funds by local governments across the poor and the non-poor. Particularly the 
decentralization of the administration of anti-poverty transfers with local governments receiving 
greater responsibilities was accompanied by elite capture of public funds (Kochar, 2008). 
Recently, Panda (2015) showed the relevance of political connections for accessing BPL cards in 
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the Indian context which reinforces the expectation that connections to local governments also 
play a role for other social benefits such as social pensions. 
Third, I expect that membership of social organizations and participation in public meetings 
affect access to social pensions. Regular participation in public meetings can play an important 
role in disseminating awareness related to social pension benefits and I therefore expect that 
participating in public meetings is positively associated with social pension coverage. Similarly, 
membership in social organizations such as self-help groups, caste associations or women groups 
can help to acquire awareness and capabilities relevant for social pension access. 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1 The India Human Development Survey 
The IHDS was conducted by the National Council of Applied Economic Research and University 
of Maryland (Desai et al., 2007, 2015). This nationally representative individual-level panel 
survey dataset surveyed 41,554 households (215,753) in 1503 villages and 971 urban 
neighborhoods across India using a stratified, multistage sampling procedure in 2004-05 and re-
interviewed households in 2011-12.6 The survey is spread over all the states and union territories 
of India except Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep which together account for less 
than 0.05% of India’s population. The IHDS includes a broad range of economic development 
question modules regarding demographics, health, public welfare programs, fertility, agriculture, 
employment, gender relations and women’s status, beliefs, education, social networks, 
institutions, etc. at both individual and household level (Desai et al., 2007). From IHDS data, I 
use information on social pension receipt, eligibility of the individual (age, land holding, 
household assets, BPL card), local government connection, participation in public meeting and 
membership of social organization. I control for labor market participation, education, mass 
media usage, gender, household size, number of adults living in the household, urban areas, caste 
belonging and religion. The complete list of variables and their definitions is shown in Appendix 
1. As IHDS is the first national panel data set covering multiple topics and collected before and 
after the major reforms in 2007, it is the most suitable data set for the analysis of social pension 
targeting in India. 
                                                          
6 In 2004-05, the survey covers 26,734 households (143,374 individuals) in rural areas and 14,820 households 
(72,380 individuals) in urban areas. In 2011-12, the survey covers 27,579 rural household (135,118 individuals) and 
14,573 urban households (69,450 individuals) (Desai et al., 2015). 
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In the empirical analysis, I focus on individuals in the relevant age group and exclude children 
and adults who are much younger than the eligibility age. Based on descriptive statistics from 
IHDS showing that the eligibility cutoff is not strictly enforced in practice (Appendix 3), I use a 
sample of individuals who are at maximum 10 years younger than the state level eligibility age 
for social pension.7 Moreover, for assessing the changes in relevant factors over time, it is 
essential for the regression analysis that individuals are surveyed twice. To ensure comparability 
between the descriptive statistics and empirical estimations, I present the entire empirical 
analysis for a balanced panel.  
4.2 Methodology 
The descriptive analysis of the targeting performance is based on the calculation of two 
commonly used measures for assessing the targeting performance: Coverage of the elderly poor 
and targeting errors. To judge whether an individual is poor or not it is necessary to take into 
account that consumption expenditures of social pension recipients might be above the poverty 
line due to the social pension receipt but could have been below the poverty line in the absence 
of the transfer. To ensure that these individuals are counted as poor beneficiaries, I implement a 
preparatory adjustment in two steps: I first adjust the monthly per capita consumption 
expenditure for the social pension benefits received and second compare the adjusted value of 
consumption expenditure per capita to the local poverty line.8 Based on the existing qualitative 
and quantitative studies analyzing the impact of social pensions on consumption expenditures 
(e.g. Help Age International, 2009; Kaushal, 2014; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2006), this calculation 
assumes that social pension benefits are pooled with other household income. In the developing 
country setting, it seems to be more plausible that the social pension income is shared with other 
household members than consumed entirely by the beneficiary.9 
After this preparatory adjustment, I calculate the coverage of the elderly poor, the exclusion error 
and the inclusion error. In the case of social pensions, the coverage of elderly poor is the number 
of elderly poor receiving social pensions divided by the number of elderly poor. The exclusion 
                                                          
7 The eligibility ages across India are shown in Appendix 2. 
8 The local poverty line accounts for different price levels over time, between states and between rural and urban 
areas and is based on the Tendulkar approach for both years to ensure comparability. Due to the extremely high 
inflation in 2012, the poverty line is also adjusted for the month of the interview (Desai et al., 2015). 
9 Heterogeneity in this regard cannot be ruled out and this approach is a necessary simplification of the real 
circumstances. 
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error is the number of elderly poor not receiving social pensions divided by the number of 
elderly poor and the inclusion error is the number of non-targeted beneficiaries (who are either 
younger than the eligibility age or non-poor or both) divided by the number of beneficiaries. 
Considering the high costs of targeting and the limited availability of resources in developing 
countries, I compare the targeting errors of social pensions to the targeting errors of a 
hypothetical random allocation of social pension benefits (e.g. Besley & Kanbur, 1990). This 
helps us to understand the benefits of the existing targeting approach and to compare it to a much 
cheaper alternative – the random allocation of social pensions. I simply subtract the actual 
targeting error from the targeting error under random allocation to measure the benefits of 
targeting social pensions towards the poor instead of distributing social pensions randomly to 
individuals.10 
To understand which factors affect access to social pensions, I estimate a linear probability model 
(LPM) with the baseline specification presented below. For all specifications, the dependent 
variable is social pension receipt and the variables of interest reflect eligibility for social pension 
receipt (age, household assets, land holding and BPL card) and social capital (local government 
connection, public meeting and social organization). I exploit the panel data structure of the data 
to estimate a LPM with individual fixed effects. This approach removes the omitted variable bias 
related to unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics that the cross-sectional regressions 
are suffering from. I use interaction terms between the time dummy and variables of interest to 
assess how factors changed over time. Finally, I am interested in understanding whether the 
factors of interest, namely eligibility and indicators of social capital, play a different role for poor 
and non-poor households. To test this empirically, I employ triple interactions of the time 
dummy, the variables of interest and a dummy for being poor in terms of asset ownership. 
Equation 1: Baseline specification Social pension receiptit=  β0 + β1Ageit +  β2Assetsit + β3Landit +  β4BPL cardit+ β5Local government connectionit + β6Public meetingit+ β7Social organizationit + β8Aftert + γXit + ai + uit 
                                                          
10 I thank Stefan Klonner and Michael Schleicher for suggesting this comparison. 
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In line with the research interest of this study, the LPM is particularly suitable for the estimation 
of marginal effects in fixed-effects regression models (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Wooldridge, 
2002) and for examining changes over time with interaction terms (Ai & Norton, 2003). All 
regression results are presented with robust standard errors that are adjusted for the conditional 
heteroscedasticity in the estimation of LPM (Wooldridge, 2002). 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
The sample of analysis includes all elderly who are at maximum 10 years younger than the 
eligibility age and surveyed twice by IHDS (balanced panel). The summary statistics are shown 
in Table 2 separately for 2004-05 and 2011-12.11 The share of elderly receiving social pension 
increased from 5.3 percent in 2004-05 to 24.4 percent in 2011-12. Concerning the independent 
variables of interest indicating eligibility for social pensions, I observe that the average age has 
increased from 61.8 years to 68.7 years corresponding to the time between the two survey rounds 
and the share of elderly individuals living in households that hold BPL cards increased from 33.5 
percent to 40.6 percent. Ownership of assets has increased from 12.8 to 15.3 assets on average 
while the size of land holding declined from 2.4 acres to 2.0 acres on average. These are both 
factors that might have been used to assess the poverty status of social pension applicants prior to 
the social pension reforms; however the destitution criterion provided by the national government 
lacks any further specification. Concerning the independent variables of interest indicating social 
capital in different forms, I observe that the share of elderly living in households that are directly 
connected with the local government officials has increased substantially from 11.0 percent to 
28.3 percent. Participation in public meetings stayed stable (30.3 percent to 31.4 percent) and 
membership in social organizations increased from 35.3 percent to 39.2 percent. 
Concerning the control variables, I observe that watching TV and reading newspaper has become 
less common (potentially driven by access to other media at the household level). Other co-
variates developed as expected. Education levels of the elderly stayed at the same level (3 years 
of education on average), the household highest education levels increased slightly from 8.3 to 
8.5 years. Directly related to the well-being of elderly individuals, I observe that from 2004-05 to 
                                                          
11 For simplicity, I use the term elderly even though the sample includes individuals who are at maximum 10 years 
below the local eligibility age for social pensions. 
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2011-12, the labor force participation of the elderly in the sample (defined as having worked at 
least 240 hours in the last year) declined from 55.9 percent to 33.6 percent. This reduction in 
labor force participation seems to be primarily driven by the higher age of individuals in the 
sample. Moreover, the share of elderly individuals living in households in which at least one 
person has a permanent job, slightly increased from 14.5 percent to 17.5 percent. I also control 
for village level variables indicating development in the village (share of electrified households), 
collaboration between villagers (families collaborate) and absence of conflicts (peaceful village). 
All these three indicators measured at the village level have improved over time with higher 
shares of households having electricity, higher shares of households reporting that families help 
each other to solve local problems and higher shares of household reporting that people get well 
along with each other. 
The variable Poor Tendulkar in the bottom of the table indicates whether an individual has a per 
capita consumption level below the local poverty line following the Tendulkar approach for both 
years. The variable Poor Tendulkar adjusted, as described above, accounts for the social pension 
benefits received to facilitate the calculation of exclusion and inclusion errors. Due to this 
adjustment, the latter shows a slightly higher share of individuals with consumption levels below 
the poverty line. Overall, the share of elderly individuals living below the poverty line decreased 
from 30.0 percent to 16.7 percent (based on Poor Tendulkar). 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
 IHDS 2004-05 IHDS 2011-12 Variable 
category  mean sd min max mean sd min max 
Social pension 0.053 0.225 0 1 0.244 0.430 0 1 
Dependent 
variable and 
independent. 
variables of 
interest 
Age 61.819 7.537 45 100 68.680 8.284 45 99 
BPL card 0.335 0.472 0 1 0.406 0.491 0 1 
Household assets 12.825 6.266 0 30 15.343 6.352 0 30 
Land holding 2.413 5.699 0 200 2.010 6.924 0 400 
Local government 
connection 
0.110 0.313 0 1 0.283 0.450 0 1 
Public meeting 0.303 0.460 0 1 0.314 0.464 0 1 
Social organization 0.353 0.478 0 1 0.392 0.488 0 1 
Watching TV 0.344 0.475 0 1 0.256 0.436 0 1 
Control 
variables 
Reading newspaper 0.853 0.354 0 1 0.659 0.474 0 1 
Education 3.072 4.326 0 15 3.021 4.306 0 15 
Highest adult education 
in household 
8.297 5.093 0 15 8.497 5.139 0 15 
Working 0.559 0.496 0 1 0.336 0.472 0 1 
Permanent job in 
household 
0.145 0.352 0 1 0.175 0.380 0 1 
Share of electrified 
households 
0.760 0.298 0 1 0.881 0.202 0 1 
Families collaborate 0.596 0.491 0 1 0.739 0.439 0 1 
Peaceful village 0.543 0.498 0 1 0.599 0.490 0 1 
Head of household 0.506 0.500 0 1 0.520 0.500 0 1 
Widow 0.238 0.426 0 1 0.359 0.480 0 1 
Household size 6.139 3.290 1 38 5.407 2.956 1 30 
Urban 0.270 0.444 0 1 0.296 0.456 0 1 
Other backward castes 0.405 0.491 0 1 0.412 0.492 0 1 
Scheduled castes 0.181 0.385 0 1 0.184 0.387 0 1 
Scheduled tribes 0.061 0.240 0 1 0.062 0.241 0 1 
Female 0.514 0.500 0 1 0.517 0.500 0 1 Time-
invariant 
characteristics 
Hindu 0.823 0.382 0 1 0.828 0.378 0 1 
Muslim 0.096 0.295 0 1 0.097 0.296 0 1 
Poor Tendulkar 0.300 0.458 0 1 0.167 0.373 0 1 Poverty 
measure Poor Tendulkar adj. 0.303 0.460 0 1 0.183 0.387 0 1 
Observations 14952 14952  
The sample is restricted to individuals at maximum 10 years younger below eligibility age. For the definitions of all 
variables see Appendix 1. The variables social pension, age, education, working, head of household, widow and 
female are measured at the individual level; the other variables are measured at the household level. 
Source: Author’s illustration based on IHDS I for 2004-05 and IHDS II for 2011-12.
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Building up on the summary statistics that showed that a larger share of the individuals in the 
sample received social pension benefits in 2011-12, Figure 3 shows that the social pension 
coverage of the elderly poor improved over time. The share of elderly poor receiving social 
pensions tripled from 2004-05 to 2011-12 at the national level. This improvement was even 
stronger in urban areas where the coverage quadrupled. 
Figure 3: Coverage of elderly poor 
 
Figures account for sampling weights.  
Source: Author’s illustration based on IHDS I for 2004-05 and IHDS II for 2011-12. 
Despite of this progress in covering a higher share of elderly poor, the calculation of exclusion 
and inclusion errors makes the weak targeting performance of social pensions evident. In 2004-
05 and 2011-12, a large share of elderly poor lacked access to social pension benefits (exclusion 
error) and a large share of non-poor elderly individuals received the social pension (inclusion 
error).  
The first part of Figure 4 shows that the exclusion error (EE) decreased from 87% in 2004-05 to 
62% in 2011-12. The share of targeted individuals (older than the local retirement age and poor) 
who did not receive the social pension among all targeted individuals was reduced by about 25 
percentage points. The pattern is similar in rural and urban India. In contrast to the decreasing 
exclusion error, the inclusion error (IE) increased from 63% in 2004-05 to 69% in 2011-12. This 
aggregate development seems to be mainly driven by the increasing inclusion error in rural areas 
All India Rural Urban
2004-05 12.70% 13.60% 7.80%
2011-12 38.00% 39.30% 32.60%
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as the inclusion error stayed stable in urban areas. It seems that the reforms, i.e. the expansion of 
social pension coverage and the change in the eligibility criteria towards relying increasingly on 
BPL card holding, have contributed to reducing the erroneous exclusion of individuals from 
social pension benefits but increased the erroneous inclusion of individuals in the welfare 
scheme. Overall, both errors continue to be very high. Almost two third of the elderly poor 
continue to be left out (exclusion error) and similarly two thirds of the beneficiaries are either 
non-poor or younger than the eligibility age or both and receive social pension benefits (inclusion 
error). 
Since these targeting errors appear to be very high, it is relevant to assess how the targeting of 
social pensions in India performs in comparison to a hypothetical random allocation of social 
pension benefits. As illustrated in the second part of Figure 4, in 2004-05 the real exclusion error 
was only 6 percentage points lower than exclusion error under random allocation. This nominal 
benefit of targeting increased over time to a difference of 13.5 percentage points in 2011-12. For 
the inclusion error, I observe the opposite. While in 2004-05, the inclusion error used to be 22 
percentage points lower under targeted allocation compared to random allocation, in 2011-12 this 
benefit from targeting reduced to 12 percentage points. In terms of wrongly excluding poor 
elderly from the scheme, the targeting performance has improved over time as the difference 
between the targeting error under random allocation and the real targeting error increased. 
However, in terms of including non-targeted individuals, the targeting performance has 
deteriorated as the difference between the targeting error under random allocation and the real 
targeting error decreased. Overall, this comparison shows that despite of the social pension 
reforms the benefits from targeting compared to the random allocation seem to be relatively small 
and the applied targeting approaches in 2004-05 and 2011-12 would be even more questionable if 
there was data available allowing a measurement of the costs of targeting. 
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Figure 4: Targeting errors  
(a) Development of exclusion error (EE) and inclusion error (IE) from 2004-05 to 2011-12 
 
(b) Compared to random allocation of social pension benefits 
 
Figures account for sampling weights.  
Source: Author’s illustration based on IHDS I for 2004-05 and IHDS II for 2011-12. 
EE India EE Rural EE Urban IE India IE Rural IE Urban
2004-05 87.33% 92.20% 86.39% 62.83% 61.29% 72.69%
2011-12 61.98% 67.39% 60.71% 68.84% 68.26% 71.54%
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5.2 Regression results 
I present below the results from the LPM estimations in different specifications. All regression 
models include all control variables, time fixed effects and individual fixed effects. Table 3 
shows the regression results introducing the social capital variables separately and in the last 
specification jointly. Since the coefficients are very close to each other in size and statistical 
significance, the preferred specification is the last one which includes all the independent 
variables of interest.  
Keeping all other factors constant, obtaining access to social pensions in 2011-12 is 10.8 
percentage points more likely than in 2004-05. This difference is significant at the 1 percent level 
and seems to be primarily attributable to the removal of the cap on the number of beneficiaries. 
Further, being 10 years older increases the likelihood of receiving social pensions by 4.8 
percentage points and holding a BPL card by 6.6 percentage points. Both coefficients are 
significant at the 1 percent level. Given the average predicted value of access to social pensions 
being 13.8 percent, the size of the coefficients is also economically significant. 
Regarding the social capital variables, the panel regression results support only the theoretical 
expectation on the relevance of connections to the local government for access to social pension 
benefits. Living in a household that reports direct connections to the local government is 
associated with a 2.3 percentage points higher chance of receiving social pensions (significant at 
the 5 percent level). Participation in public meetings and membership in social organizations are 
not associated with social pension receipt.  
Asset ownership and land holding, two relevant proxies for assessing medium- to long-term 
poverty are not significantly related to access to social pensions despite of the scheme’s official 
objective to target the elderly poor. In the fixed effects regressions presented here these effects 
vanish, probably because most households who are poor in 2004-05 also remain poor in the 
second period and hence the effect is soaked up by the individual fixed effects. 
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Table 3: Panel analysis of access to social pensions 
 Linear probability model with individual fixed effects: 
2004-05 to 2011-12 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
After 0.1075*** 0.1111*** 0.1110*** 0.1075*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age 0.0048*** 0.0048*** 0.0048*** 0.0048*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BPL card 0.0661*** 0.0661*** 0.0661*** 0.0661*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Household assets 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Land holding 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Local government connection 0.0230**   0.0231** 
 (0.009)   (0.010) 
Public meeting  0.0034  -0.0004 
  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Social organization   0.0013 0.0007 
   (0.008) (0.008) 
     
Observations 29,904 29,904 29,904 29,904 
Number of id 14,952 14,952 14,952 14,952 
Avg. prediction of Y 0.138 0.138 0.138 0.138 
Share of predicted values in [0;1] 85% 85% 85% 85% 
Adjusted within R-squared 0.203 0.202 0.202 0.203 
The dependent variable is social pension receipt. Using sampling weights, I account for sampling design. Cluster-
robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. All control variables are included.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Author’s estimations based on IHDS I for 2004-05 and IHDS II for 2011-12. 
 
These results provide a first impression of the relevant factors but do not indicate how these 
factors have changed over time in response to the described reforms in 2006-07. To test whether 
the relevance of BPL card holding, local government connection, participation in public meetings 
and membership in social organizations changed from 2004-05 to 2011-12, I include interaction 
terms of the dummy variable after and these variables of interest in the regression. Table 4 
presents the marginal effects for each time period resulting from the regression including all 
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variables of interest and their interaction terms as well as all control variables and individual 
fixed effects.12 
In line with the changed national eligibility guidelines, BPL card holding substantially gained 
importance. In 2011-2012, an individual who holds a BPL card has ceteris paribus a 16.2 
percentage points higher chance to obtain access to social pensions indicating that the centrally 
reformed eligibility criterion was implemented by the local governments in panchayats and 
municipalities. During the considered time period, the BPL card has become the most important 
determinant of access to social pensions and is significant at the 1 percent level. As described 
before, prior to the reform, local government officials were requested to select individuals for the 
national social pension scheme based on the destitution criteria and I observe that BPL card 
holding in the 2004-05 was negatively associated with social pension access. Since individuals 
living in households that held a BPL card were entitled to access other anti-poverty schemes 
(such as subsidized food or public works program), they were potentially considered as less 
destitute than those who lived in households that did not even have a BPL card. 
The expectation of the relevance of connections with the local government is supported by the 
empirical analysis. The results in Table 4 show that having direct connections with local 
government officials gained importance over time. In 2004-05, I do not observe any significant 
effect of connections to the local government on the likelihood of receiving social pensions. 
However in 2011-12, being connected to the local government increases the likelihood of 
receiving social pensions by 3.2 percentage points (significant at the 1 percent level). 
                                                          
12 The regression results are shown in Appendix 4. For readability, I present directly the marginal effects here, as the 
marginal effect for the time period after the reform is the linear combination of the coefficient of the independent 
variable of interest and the of the coefficient of the interaction term of the independent variable of interest and the 
time dummy. 
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Table 4: Access to social pensions - marginal effects before and after the reform 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
BPL 
Local government 
connection Public meeting Social organization 
          
Before -0.0354*** 0.0076 -0.0128 -0.0102 
 
(0.002) (0.651) (0.282) (0.309) 
After 0.1622*** 0.0316*** 0.0082 0.0092 
 
(0.000) (0.009) (0.468) (0.352) 
     P-values are shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author’s estimations based on IHDS I for 2004-05 and IHDS II for 2011-12. 
These results potentially mask heterogeneity in the factors playing a role for elderly individuals 
from poor and non-poor households. To examine the heterogeneity between these two groups for 
access to social pension benefits before and after the reform, I include triple interaction terms of 
the time dummy, the variables of interest and the dummy for living in an asset poor household.13 
The variable asset poor is equal to 1 if the household’s asset ownership is in the lowest quartile 
of the asset ownership distribution.  
Before the reforms, the negative and significant coefficient of BPL card holding that I observe for 
the full sample is driven by the individuals living in asset non-poor households. I only observe 
the negative association between BPL card holding and social pension receipt in 2004-05 for the 
individuals living in asset non-poor households but not for individuals living in asset poor 
households. After the reform, BPL card holding is relevant for individuals living in asset poor 
and asset non-poor households. For individuals living in asset poor households, holding a BPL 
card is associated with a 13.9 percentage points higher likelihood of receiving social pensions. 
For individuals from asset non-poor households it is even associated with a 15.8 percentage 
points higher likelihood of receiving social pensions. This result strongly indicates that non-poor 
individuals exploit the unwarranted possession of BPL cards to obtain social pension benefits. 
For the other factors, I do not observe significant differences between the two groups. However, 
the effect of local government connections on social pension receipt seems to be primarily driven 
by individuals living in asset non-poor households.  
                                                          
13 I prefer this approach compared to using a dummy variable for being poor (based on the Tendulkar poverty line) as 
this would rely on consumption expenditures which are directly impacted by the social pension income. The full 
regression tables are presented in the Appendix. 
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Table 5: Heterogeneous marginal effects for asset poor and asset non-poor individuals 
Period Variable Asset poor  Asset non-poor  P-value of difference 
     
     
Before BPL card 0.0213 -0.0523*** 0.0023 
After BPL card 0.1394*** 0.1583*** 0.4094 
     
Before Local government connection -0.0012 0.0052 0.8367 
After Local government connection 0.0251 0.0587*** 0.7267 
     
Before Public meeting 0.0005 -0.0202 0.2682 
After Public meeting 0.0190 0.0073 0.6788 
     
Before Social organization -0.0072 -0.0134 0.5475 
After Social organization 0.0225 0.0079 0.5471 
P-values are shown in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author’s estimations based on IHDS I for 2004-05 and IHDS II for 2011-12. 
5.3 Robustness 
The increased coverage could lead to a simultaneity bias if the dependent variable and the 
independent variables of interest increased independently driven by some unobservable factors. I 
am particularly concerned by the relatively strong increase observed for the dependent variable 
social pension receipt and the independent variables BPL card holding and local government 
connection. This spurious correlation could be the only reason for observing that BPL card 
holding and connections to local government officials have become more important for access to 
social pension benefits from 2004-05 to 2011-12 as described in the previous section. 
To address this concern, I conduct a placebo check. I randomly assign social pension receipt in 
both time periods to the individuals in the sample to mimic the coverage expansion that took 
place from 2004-05 to 2011-12. In this random allocation, I take into account the number of 
beneficiaries in 2004-05, in 2011-12 and how many individuals received social pensions in both 
rounds. I also account for the fact that in the Indian social pension system, individuals who start 
to receive social pension in one period typically continue receiving it in the next period 
independent of their poverty status.  
Given this random allocation, I run the same regressions again and use random pension recipient 
as dependent variable. Under random allocation, the positive and significant effects of political 
connections and BPL card holding that I observed before for the second time period, completely 
disappear and thereby the placebo test confirms that the previously found relationship between 
these two variables of interest and the dependent variable were not caused by a spurious 
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correlation between the left hand side variable and the right hand side variables. The results of the 
placebo check are visualized below. 
Figure 5: Placebo check 
 
Source: Author’s illustration and estimation based on IHDS I for 2004-05 and IHDS II for 2011-12. 
6. Conclusion 
This study aimed to examine the targeting performance of social pensions in India and to answer 
the question of who receives the social pension benefits. The descriptive statistics show that from 
2004-05 to 2011-12, a time period encompassing important social pension reforms, the targeting 
of social pensions improved only partially. The exclusion error reduced substantially from 87 
percent to 62 percent but the inclusion error increased from 63 percent to 69 percent, indicating 
that a major share of resources continues to be absorbed by non-targeted individuals who are 
either non-poor or younger than the retirement age. The reduction of the exclusion error seems to 
be primarily achieved through the removal of the cap on the number of beneficiaries allowing 
elderly individuals to apply any time and increasing their chances to obtain access to social 
pension benefits. Nevertheless, the persistently high targeting errors indicate that social pension 
reforms in the past have not been successful in facilitating access for the majority of elderly poor. 
Before: BPL card
After: BPL card
Before: Local government connection
After: Local government connection
Before: Public meeting
After: Public meeting
Before: Social organization
After: Social organization
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Particularly, the very low benefits of targeting apparent when comparing the targeting errors 
under random allocation to actual targeting errors imply that there is urgent need to reconsider the 
targeting of social pension benefits in India due to the obvious difficulties in identifying the 
elderly poor for the scheme. For the ongoing debate on targeting versus universalizing social 
pension benefits, future research that compares the costs to the benefits of targeting will be 
particularly informative. 
As intended by the reforms, I find that holding a BPL card has become the primary determinant 
of access to social pensions. However, this result holds also for non-poor individuals who exploit 
the unwarranted possession of a BPL card to obtain social pension benefits. The results further 
indicate that after the reforms, connections to local government officials indeed facilitate access 
to social pension benefits. This result in combination with the insight that weakly targeted BPL 
cards enable non-poor individuals to access social pension benefits makes evident how 
challenging targeting in India has been since the introduction of targeted anti-poverty schemes 
and continues to be despite the described reform efforts. 
Although with the reforms of the national social pension scheme in 2007 the allocation of social 
pensions has shifted towards a more observable criterion, the BPL card, this criterion itself is too 
weakly implemented to achieve effective targeting of the poor. This indicates the deeply-rooted 
targeting problem of BPL cards in India. Hence, using the allocation of ration cards as a tool to 
allocate benefits of a social protection scheme implies a transfer of the targeting weaknesses of 
BPL cards to the social pension scheme. The results directly support the existing literature which 
recommends a reform of the allocation of BPL cards and suggests alternative targeting 
approaches for social pensions such as the use of clear exclusion criteria that at least prevent 
clearly non-poor elderly from accessing social benefits targeted at the poor and facilitate access 
to social pensions for the elderly poor. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: List of variables 
Variable Definition 
Social pension Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual receives social pension and 0 otherwise 
After Dummy variable equal to 1 if data was collected after the reform, i.e. in 2011-12, 0 
otherwise 
BPL card Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual is entitled to benefits through the ration card, 0 
otherwise i.e. for individuals who are not entitled to BPL benefits 
Age Age of the individual 
Household assets Asset index for number of assets owned by household from 0 to 30 
Land holding Land holding in acres 
Local government 
connection 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if somebody from the household or close to the household is 
a local government official, 0 otherwise 
Public meeting Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual belongs to a household that participates 
regularly in public meetings and 0 otherwise. 
Social organization Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual belongs to a household that is member in a 
social organization, 0 otherwise 
Watching TV Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual belongs to a household watching TV regularly 
Reading newspaper Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual belongs to a household reading newspaper 
regularly, 0 otherwise 
Education Completed years of schooling 
Highest adult education 
in household 
Completed years of schooling of the most educated household member 
Working Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual works more than 240 hours per year, 0 
otherwise 
Permanent job in 
household 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if anybody in the household has a permanent job 
Families collaborate Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual lives in a household that reports that families 
collaborate to solve local problems, 0 otherwise 
Peaceful village Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual lives in a household that reports that people in 
the village/block in general get well along with each other, 0 otherwise 
Share of electrified 
households 
Share of electrified households in village or block 
Head of household Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual is head of household, 0 otherwise 
Widow Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual is widowed, 0 otherwise 
Household size Number of individuals living in the household 
Urban Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual lives in a household in urban areas, 0 otherwise 
Scheduled tribes Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual lives in a household belonging to scheduled 
tribes, 0 otherwise 
Scheduled castes Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual lives in a household belonging to scheduled 
castes, 0 otherwise 
Other backward castes Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual lives in a household belonging to other 
backward castes, 0 otherwise 
Female Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual is female, 0 otherwise 
Hindu Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual lives in a Hindu household, 0 otherwise 
Muslim Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual lives in a Muslim household, 0 otherwise 
COPC Monthly consumption expenditure per capita 
COPC adj Monthly consumption expenditure per capita adjusted 
Asset poor Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual belongs to a household in the lowest asset 
ownership quartile, 0 otherwise 
Poor  Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual belongs to a household that has a per capita 
consumption expenditure below the Tendulkar poverty line and 0 otherwise 
Poor adj. Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual belongs to a household that has a per capita 
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consumption expenditure adjusted for social pension benefits below the Tendulkar 
poverty line and 0 otherwise 
Appendix 2: State wise eligibility ages for social pensions 
State  2004-05 2011-12 
Jammu and Kashmir 65 60 
Himachal Pradesh 65 60 
Punjab 60 (f), 65 (m) 60 
Chandigarh 65 60 
Uttarakhand 65 60 
Haryana 65 60 
Delhi 60 60 
Rajasthan 55 (f), 58 (m) 55 (f), 58 (m) 
Uttar Pradesh 65 60 
Bihar 60 60 
Sikkim 65 60 
Arunachal Pradesh 60 60 
Nagaland 65 60 
Manipur 60 (f), 65 (m) 60 
Mizoram 60 (f), 65 (m) 60 
Tripura 65 60 
Meghalaya 60 (f), 65 (m) 60 
Assam 60 (f), 65 (m) 60 
West Bengal 65 60 
Jharkhand 65 60 
Odisha 65 60 
Chattisgarh 65 60 
Madhya Pradesh 65 60 
Gujarat 60 60 
Daman & Diu 60 60 
D & N Haveli 65 60 
Maharashtra 60 (f), 65 (m) 60 
Andhra Pradesh 65 60 
Karnataka 60 (f), 65 (m) 60 
Goa 60 60 
Lakshadweep 60 60 
Kerala 65 60 
Tamil Nadu 65 60 
Pondicherry 60 60 
Andaman Islands 60 60 
Notes: m: male, f: female 
Source: Kaushal, 2014 and Government of India, 2011. 
30 
 
Appendix 3: Age distribution of social pension beneficiaries 
(a) 2004-05 
 
(b) 2011-12 
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Appendix 4: How did the factors change over time? 
 
Linear probability model with individual fixed effects 
2004-05 to 2011-12 
VARIABLES  
   
BPL card -0.0354*** 
 (0.012) 
After X BPL card 0.1976*** 
 (0.013) 
Local government connection 0.0076 
 (0.017) 
After X Local government connection 0.0240 
 (0.021) 
Public meeting -0.0128 
 (0.012) 
After X Public meeting 0.0209 
 (0.016) 
Social organization -0.0102 
 (0.010) 
After X social organization 0.0194 
 
(0.013) 
 
 
Observations 29,904 
Number of id 14,952 
Weighted avg. prediction of Y 0.138 
Share of predicted values in [0;1] 85% 
Adjusted within R-squared 0.234 
The dependent variable is social pension receipt. Using sampling weights, I account for sampling design. Cluster-
robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. All control variables are included.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Author’s estimations based on IHDS I for 2004-05 and IHDS II for 2011-12. 
 
32 
 
Appendix 5: Heterogeneity analysis for asset poor and asset non-poor individuals 
VARIABLES 
Linear probability model with individual 
fixed effects  
2004-05 to 2011-12 
   
BPL card -0.0523*** 
 (0.014) 
BPL card X After 0.2107*** 
 (0.017) 
BPL card X Asset poor 0.0736*** 
 (0.024) 
BPL card X After X Asset poor -0.0925*** 
 (0.031) 
Local government connection 0.0052 
 (0.018) 
Local government connection X After  0.0307 
 (0.023) 
Local government connection X Asset poor -0.0063 
 (0.047) 
Local government connection X After X Asset poor -0.0045 
 (0.059) 
Public meeting -0.0202 
 (0.013) 
Public meeting X After 0.0275 
 (0.018) 
Public meeting X Asset poor 0.0208 
 (0.030) 
Public meeting X After X Asset poor -0.0091 
 (0.040) 
Social organization -0.0134 
 (0.011) 
Social organization X After 0.0213 
 (0.015) 
Social organization X Asset poor 0.0062 
 (0.026) 
Social organization X After X Asset poor 0.0084 
 
(0.035) 
 
 
Observations 29,904 
Number of id 14,952 
Weighted avg. prediction of Y 0.138 
Share of predicted values in [0;1] 85% 
Adjusted within R-squared 0.239 
The dependent variable is social pension receipt. I account for sampling design. Cluster-robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. All control variables are included. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Author’s estimations based on IHDS I for 2004-05 and IHDS II for 2011-12. 
